Background to the Managerial System in Ireland
The introduction of the local government managerial system in Ireland “arose partly from a pressing need to re-establish order after the civil war, and partly from a set of general assumptions about how to provide for the efficient, economical and honest organisation of public business…. The reforms also owed a lot to the actual operation of the 1898 Local Government Act [which] partly democratised local government in Ireland, without, however, cleaning it up.”¹⁶ First applied to Cork City in 1929, it was inspired by the managerial system which was then becoming popular in the United States. The system was applied to all city and county councils by 1941. Prior to the introduction of the managerial system, executive power rested with the elected members.

In essence, power under the Irish local government model is divided in two. The elected council is the policy-making arm of the local authority, who act by exercising “reserved functions.” Reserved functions are defined by law. They are specified across a whole range of enactments and include important matters of policy and finance (e.g. the adoption of the annual budget, development plans, bye laws). The day-to-day management of the local authority, including staffing matters, is vested in the manager. The manager discharges “executive functions” within the framework laid down by those policies. The elected members are also empowered to direct the manager, subject to certain limitations, as to the manner in which an executive function is to be exercised in any particular case.

The balance of power between the manager and the elected representatives has been a recurring theme in local government reform over the years. For example, the reports Local Government Reorganisation and Reform (Barrington Report) 1991and Better Local Government 1996 both looked at this issue and made recommendations on how the councillor’s role could be enhanced within the system.

There is no suggestion in the Government Programme that the managerial system should be abolished. Regardless of what reforms are introduced there will always be a need for a full time chief executive officer, and modern management structures, to deliver quality local government services. The question for this local government reform process is to identify the optimum relationship between manager and elected representatives so that local authorities meet their democratic mandate while ensuring impartial and effective service delivery.

Evolution of the Managerial System
The list of “reserved powers” granted to elected members has increased over the years in line with the growth of local government functions and new local government legislation. The booklet Local Government and the Elected Member lists 142 separate powers reserved to councillors. However, the powers of councillors have also been curtailed in some of the more important areas of decision-making (e.g. in relation to waste management). A key feature of the system is the default provision which grants the manager power to act unless powers are specifically assigned to elected members.

This division of responsibilities is viewed by some as a significant success in delivering impartial and professional local government, and by others as a negation of democracy.

In reality, the division of power is not as black and white as the legal distinction suggests: councillors and managers work in co-operation with each other in a way which transcends the legal distinctions in order to achieve mutual goals. Such informal working is a natural feature of any democratic system.

Local Government Reorganisation and Reform (Barrington Report) 1991
The 1991 Barrington Report looked at the question of the manager/councillors balance. It reported that “we are of the view that this framework is essentially correct but that certain modifications in the actual operation of the system are needed.”

The “modifications in actual operation” which the Barrington Report recommended included involving councillors more in assessing policy options and annual estimates, relaxing the ultra vires rule (which was a significant constraint on local government initiative), greater discretion in decision-making and more devolution of powers from central level, as reserved functions, to local authorities.

The report also suggested more consultation by managers on the exercise of executive functions and better channels of communication.

Many of the Barrington Report recommendations were provided for in the Local Government Acts of 1991 and 1994.

Better Local Government 1996
Better Local Government in 1996 noted that the general allocation of roles in the reserved/executive framework was considered to be “essentially correct” and set out instead to improve the policy-making role for councillors within the framework of the reserved/executive divide. It focused on strengthening the policy making function of councils with the establishment of the new structures of Corporate Policy Groups and Strategic Policy Committees. The express intention of these reforms was to enhance councillor policy input. Councillors’ sphere of influence in public service delivery at local level was also to be recognised through their leadership of County and City Development Boards.

In addition to those policy making functions, the local government reform legislation of the 1990s, culminating in the 2001 Act, also gave legal recognition to important ‘softer’ roles of the elected representative, for example, the recognition of civic leadership, the representational role of councillors and the role of local government in community development.

A further significant initiative was the end of the dual mandate under the Local Government Act 2003 as an effort to ensure a clear division in role between national parliament and local government.

Power and Accountability
Irish local government is open to criticism for a real and/or perceived lack of clear lines of accountability, both between the electorate and elected members, and the elected members and the executive. As such it is often difficult for the public to recognise whether a councillor has performed well or not. Arguably, this is exacerbated by the managerial system in which executive authority rests with the manager. The annual rotation of chairs may also contribute to a lack of clear accountability and may impede elected representatives in their individual and collective efforts to hold the executive to account.

Uncertainty regarding accountability may also be a factor in the disconnect between local government and the citizen, identified by the Taskforce on Active Citizenship.

Political Leadership through the Mayor
As discussed in Chapter 4, the proposal to introduce a directly elected mayor offers the potential to change the local government dynamic in a whole range of areas. The introduction of a full term directly elected mayor would be the most significant institutional reform to affect the councillor/manager balance. Regardless of any specific powers which may be granted to a mayor, that figure would become the visible leader of the council, and the person through whom accountability to the public would flow.

Support for Public Representatives
The ending of the dual mandate has had an impact on the role of councillors. Some councillors consider that they are under more pressure to provide services to their constituents on local authority issues which in the past would have been provided by a full time dual member TD. At the same time the operation of local governance is taking up more and more time (SPCs, area committees, CDBs etc). Many people find it difficult to take time off work to perform the functions required of them as councillors. This restricts the field of candidates available for local election.

In an effort to support councillors in their work, a range of financial supports have been provided for councillors in recent years. These include annual expenses allowances, a representational payment (€16,756 for city and county councillors), retirement gratuity, allowances for chairs of SPCs etc. Many of these supports were significantly improved in 2007 following a review and a new annual mobile phone allowance was introduced. Where new council offices have been constructed in recent years the office accommodation for councillors has also improved significantly.

Many councillors have said, however, that greater supports need to be provided to attract a new and more diverse councillor base and there have been some calls for making councillors full time. However, justifying a move to a full time councillor system (which is not commonplace in other jurisdictions) might require a severe reduction in overall councillor numbers.

Participation in events and conferences which serve to promote good governance, and which promote awareness of issues of interest to local government, are legitimate and add value to local deliberation. Concerns remain, however, regarding the number, relevance and genuine participation in conferences which are organised for councillors and the value for public money which is obtained.

Submissions from the Public and Consideration by the Consultative Committee
The submissions received from the public were broadly supportive of a rebalancing of power towards the elected members. It should be noted, however, that many of the comments on this issue came from elected representatives. Some comments suggested that while policy making is within the remit of the elected council, the control of information by the manager/officials makes it difficult for elected members fully to take control of issues. That said, there were also submissions which supported the current arrangements, citing the impartiality of the managerial system, and suggesting that the reform agenda should concentrate on service delivery rather than the balance of power within councils.

These viewpoints were mirrored in the discussion at the Consultative Committee. On the one hand it was noted that in most council areas the councillors and manager worked well together and that it was natural for tensions to arise from time to time as with any board of management. It was also pointed out that councillors retain extensive directive powers which are the real determinant of the balance of power.

The other viewpoint was that the councillors’ position was quite weak in some councils. It was stated that part time councillors do not have the time, resources or legal access to avoid strong reliance on the executive. The control of information was therefore a significantly determining factor in council decision making. The Consultative Committee noted a sense in some councils of a “them and us” attitude between councillors and officials. A contributing factor was the perception that officials controlled the flow of information in order to limit the manoeuvrability of councillors. Such an approach was not conducive to shared and positive decision making.

The debate over the balance of power also touched on the issue of decision making on locally divisive issues (Traveller accommodation, waste management etc), and the pattern in the past of providing for default decision making by the manager where councillors fail to exercise powers. This important issue is discussed separately in Chapter 10.

Options for Change
Continued Training
As noted above, councillors do have significant powers of direction and policy making. To ensure that councillors are fully aware of their functions and powers, regular courses are organised to assist them. These types of courses should be maintained, particularly as new councillors come into the system after local elections.

Training courses and conferences need to be relevant to the work of councillors. The system of financial support for conference attendance may need to be revised to encourage more in-house training, reduce incentives in the system which encourage undue travel, and ensure fuller participation in those conferences which are organised.

New Powers for Councillors?
While certain powers have been taken from local authorities over the years to be centralised in national specialist agencies (NRA, EPA, taxi regulator etc), the reality is that the business of local government has become much more complex over recent years. Many new powers and functions have been devolved to both the elected members and the executive in areas such as community development and social inclusion with new consultative systems established with other local and national agencies through the County and City Development Boards and Joint Policing Committees etc.

However, this Green Paper recognises that the key to a more accountable and democratic local government system may be the provision of directly elected mayors with enhanced powers to initiate policy. Major policy areas such as the annual budget, development plan etc may gain additional political legitimacy, and be subject to greater scrutiny and accountability, if they are more clearly seen to be the proposals of local political leaders.

Discretionary Decisions on Funding
Consideration could be given to providing further discretion to councillors on day-to-day matters – for example, allowing discretion for expenditure on minor environmental works etc without undermining the impartial function of the manager. Any such discretionary decision making must still comply with the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act for public bodies to give reasons for decisions, and for decisions to be taken in a fair manner.

Formulation of Manager/Executive Framework
The basic formulation in local government legislation, stating that ‘unless a function is explicitly reserved to the members it is a matter for the manager’, has remained largely unchanged since 1929.¹⁷ However, the Local Government Act 2001 also states explicitly that policy of the local authority is a matter for the elected council and that it is a matter for the manager to exercise the executive powers of the council.

There is an argument that this default formulation is no longer needed – that the formulation works on a psychological level to suggest that the balance of power is skewed more towards the executive than is actually the case; a question of perception more than reality perhaps?

The main draw-back of dropping the formulation is that it would create uncertainty where certainty exists today. If the formulation was to be dropped the question arises as to the necessity or otherwise of delimiting the use of directive powers under section 140 of the 2001 Act, e.g. in relation to individual planning applications or other areas of executive decision making?

Further Reform of Strategic Policy Committees and Corporate Policy Groups
The Strategic Policy Committees and the Corporate Policy Groups were envisaged by Better Local Government as a means of enhancing local authority member policy input. Where the SPC/CPG system is working well the system enhances councillor policy input.

The operation of these arrangements was reviewed by the IPA in 2004 and recommendations made to improve the operation of the system.

As mentioned in Chapter 4 it is suggested that the chairs of SPCs be elected for the full term of the council’s duration to create continuity and prestige in those positions and in the Corporate Policy Group - effectively creating a 5 year cabinet.